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Introduction
Globalisation is the defining socio-economic characteristic of our
time (Khor, 2000). Time and space are shrinking and many borders are
disappearing, giving rise to an increasing interdependence between
economies, between cultures and between people.
This latest historical stage has created new opportunities and raised
new hopes for the developing world. Technological innovations, expand-
ing trade and increasing foreign direct investment offer enormous poten-
tial to eliminate poverty in the century that has just started (UNDP, 1999).
Until now, however, globalisation has been driven by the expansion of
markets, leading to increasing levels of inequality in income, resources
and opportunities. It has benefited only one fifth of the world’s popula-
tion, while marginalizing the rest.
This paper analyses the impact of globalisation on human poverty and
income distribution within and between countries. While the record so
far has not been too bright, the paper argues that globalisation – if organ-
ised differently and managed in favour of the poor – can lead to human
development for a majority of the world’s population in the near future.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 1 discusses the main com-
ponents of the process of globalisation and some of its potential benefits;
Section 2 studies the impact of globalisation on human poverty and
income inequality in the world over the last few decades; Section 3 pro-
poses some measures that are needed to manage globalisation in favour
of the poor.
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1. GLOBALISATION: DEFINITION, CAUSES, AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS
1.1 Definition and main characteristics
Many economists see the current process of globalisation as the continu-
ation of a long process of increasing interaction between nations and between
people in the world economy. Sachs and Warner (1995, p. 5), for example,
argue that ‘the re-emergence of a global, capitalist market economy since
1950, and especially since the mid-1980s, in an important sense re-establish-
es the global market economy that had existed one hundred years earlier’.
The current process, which started with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System in the early 1970s has, however, important particularities
that make it historically unique (UNDP, 1999). First and foremost, the aston-
ishing volume of international financial transactions and its increasing
independence from real economic operations are major defining character-
istics of the current process of globalisation that distinguish it from other
periods of capitalist development. Second, new actors have emerged, from
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to the WTO. With new rules and norms,
they play a leading role in shaping the global economic environment. Third,
faster and cheaper means of communication have been created.
1.2 The internationalisation of financial transactions
Globalisation at the end of the twentieth century is primarily ‘economy-
and finance-led’ (Malhotra, 1997, p. 1). This economic process can be
described as a situation of ‘economic interdependence between countries
where cross-border linkages among markets and production and financial
activities have reached such an extent that economic developments in any
one country are influenced to a significant degree by policies and develop-
ments outside its boundaries’ (Milberg, 1998, p. 71). As such, it has three
different dimensions: increasing trade flows, increasing foreign direct
investment (FDI) and increasing financial flows.
a) Increases in trade flows
In the last twenty-five years, world trade has grown much faster than
world GDP (figure 1). As a result of this unprecedented expansion, world
export flows increased from 12.1% of world GDP in 1985 to around 20% in
the late 1990s, reaching $7 trillion in 1998 (UNDP, 1999).
This dramatic growth of international trade has been mainly caused by
the liberalisation policies that most developing countries have implemented
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in the last twenty-five years. It has also been facilitated by the expansion of
Transnational Corporations (TNCs): the number of TNCs increased from
7,000 in 1970 to 37,000 in the early 90s, reaching 44,000 with 280,000 for-
eign affiliates in 1996 (Malhotra, 1997). The substantial reduction in trans-
port costs, in the case of air transportation by more than 50% since 1950
(Milberg, 1998) also contributed.
World trade is not only much larger than ever before but it has also
experienced important qualitative changes (Krugman, 1995). First, there
has been a rise of intra-industrial trade, that is, of exchanges of similar
goods between similar countries. Second, production is now organised on
a global scale with the production process broken into many geographical-
ly separated stages. Third, ‘super-traders’ have emerged, countries with
extremely high ratios of trade to GDP. Finally, and more importantly, a
tremendous expansion of manufacturing exports from some developing
countries has taken place.
This last tendency has raised new possibilities for developing countries.
While this group as a whole saw its share of world exports decrease from
Figure 1. World Trade and GDP, 1976-1999 (1976=100)
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Table 1. MANUFACTURES AS % OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, 1997
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Republic of Korea 92a 106a
Czech Republic 85 --
Argentina 34 160
Poland 73 116
Costa Rica 26a 113a
Mexico 81 298
Malaysia 76a 279a
Colombia 31 182
Thailand 71 188
Ecuador 9 1128
Brazil 54 123
Jamaica 69a 130a
Turkey 75 123
China 85 --
Albania 65 --
South Africa 55 --
Tunisia 78 175
Indonesia 42 325
El Salvador 39 151
Bolivia 16 4,219
Honduras 27 739
Guatemala 30 147
Egypt 40 400
Nicaragua 25 389
India 72a 125a
Pakistan 86 139
Nepal 95 161
Bangladesh 87a 133a
a. Data refers to 1996
Source: UNDP, 1999
% Index
(1985=100)
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1975 to 1994 (Milberg, 1998), during those years some regions increased
tremendously their market shares, especially in manufactured goods.
Countries like Botswana, China, the Dominican Republic and the Republic
of Korea enjoyed average annual rates of growth in their exports of more
than 10% (UNDP, 1999). In fact, export specialisation in primary goods is
no longer a defining characteristic of many developing countries (see table
1). Some developing countries have indeed been able to penetrate the
highly competitive OECD markets: the New Industrialized Economies of
Asia (Korea, Taiwan, province of China, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand) plus China increased their import penetration in
OECD manufactures from a level of 0.4% in 1975 to almost 2.6% in 1992
(Milberg, 1999).
b) Increases in FDI flows
FDI also increased substantially in the last two decades, reaching $400
billion in 1997, seven times the 1970s level in real terms (UNDP, 1999). As
a result, between the early 1980s and the early 1990s the share of FDI in the
aggregate gross capital formation rose by 66% for the world as a whole, by
75% for developing countries (Milberg, 1998).
One of the positive characteristics of FDI expansion has been the
increasing participation of developing countries. Their share in net FDI
flows rose from an annual average of 17% in the period 1987-1992 to 24%
in 1998 (see figure 2). As will be discussed in the next section, this increase
was very unevenly distributed among countries: 85% of the direct invest-
ment that went to developing countries in 1998 was concentrated in only
twenty countries, most of which enjoyed very high average annual rates of
FDI inflows between 1985 and 1997 (see table 2).
c) Increases in other financial flows
A plethora of examples can illustrate the acceleration in the number
and volume of exchanges of all kinds of financial assets:
In 1973, the volume of foreign exchange traded daily in the world mar-
ket ranged between $10 and $20 billion, while the ratio of foreign-exchange
trading to world trade did not exceed 2/1 in any single day. By 1980, how-
ever, these numbers had increased to $80 billion and a ratio of 10/1 respec-
tively. By 1992, daily trading averaged $880 billion (ratio to world trade of
50/1) and by 1995 it had reached $1,269 billion – an amount equal to sev-
enty times the value of world trade or to the entire world’s official gold and
foreign exchange reserves (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000).
Between 1983 and 1993, annual sales and purchases of US Treasury
bonds in the world market increased from $30 billion to $500 billion
(Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). In the United States alone, the total volume of
financial transactions between residents and non-residents was $66 billion
in 1975, $251 billion in 1980 and almost $5,500 billion in 1989 – more than
fifty times the net FDI to the United States in that same year (Milberg, 1999).
International bank lending grew from $265 billion in 1975 to $4.2 tril-
lion nineteen years later (UNDP, 1999).
The expansion of financial operations has coincided with the introduc-
tion of new financial instruments such as note-issuance facilities, swaps,
options and forward rate agreements. The outstanding contracts in
exchange financial derivatives (including both interest rate and currency
futures and options) reached about US$ 5,000 billion during the early 1990s.
Developing countries have been active participants in the expansion of
world international financial operations. Net portfolio capital inflows to
developing countries increased at an annual average rate of 40% between
1990 and 1998, constituting nearly 70% of the world’s net portfolio capital
inflows in the latter year (UNDP, 2000). As with FDI, however, such an
increase has been concentrated in a very small number of countries; for
example, in 1997 twenty developing countries received 94% of the financial
flows (UNDP, 1999).
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Figure 2. Net foreign direct investiment, 1987-1992 and 1998 (US$ million). Source:
UNDP, 1999.
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1.3 The new actors of the global world
The Bretton Woods institutions strongly shaped the new global eco-
nomic order through their liberal-oriented policies. Alongside them, new
actors like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have emerged. WTO’s
authority over governments and multinational corporations is not ques-
tionable; in addition, it has been a key factor in the multiplication of mul-
tilateral agreements on trade, intellectual property and services.
Table 2. NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ($ millions), 1985-1997
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
China 1,659 453,000 59.60
Brazil 1,441 16,330 22.42
Mexico 1,984 12,101 16.26
Singapore 1,047 10,000 20.69
Argentina 919 6,327 17.44
Russian Federation -- 6,241 --
Chile 144 5,417 35.30
Indonesia 310 5,350 26.79
Poland 15 5,000 62.27
Venezuela 68 4,893 42.81
Malaysia 695 3,754 15.09
Thailand 163 3,600 29.42
Hong Kong (China) -140 2,600 --
Colombia 1,023 2,447 7.54
Korea, Rep. Of 234 2,341 21.16
Taiwan, prov. of China -- 2,248 --
Hungary -- 2,085 --
Peru 1 2,000 88.40
Kazakhstan -- 1,320 --
These countries together constitute 85% of FDI to developing countries
Source: UNDP, 1999
1985 1997 annual av.
growth rate
At the regional and sub-regional levels, new blocks have formed, with the
dual aims of fostering regional integration and of building solid regional
blocks – solid enough to stand up to the challenge of globalisation as well as
to promote common policies. This has been the case in Africa with the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC), in Europe with the European
Union (EU), and in Asia with the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), to name but a few. More importantly, globalisation has graduated
from a single phenomenon that one describes to a sort of ideology that one
prescribes. Countries are urged to embrace globalisation, to become more
market-oriented, to open their economies and to compete on the world mar-
kets – all on the argument that this is the only strategy that can help foster
economic growth and reduce poverty. One area where such a prescription
has yielded impressive results is that of the removal of tariff barriers. In
India, between 1990 and 1997, the average rate of import tax dropped from
82% to 30%. In Brazil, over the same period, it fell from 25% to 12%, while
in China it went from 43% to 18%. In 1991, 35 countries had modified their
regulatory frameworks to make them more in line with the prescriptions of
the new policy. In 1995, G8 countries introduced similar changes.
The ‘global ideology’ brought in by globalisation is also remarkable in that
the quasi-consensus on many issues it has led to has resulted in the adoption
of action plans and common goals on the occasion of global summits.
Last, and certainly not least, civil society has emerged as a stronger
force than at any point in the past, determined but also able to make the
voice of the have-nots heard loud and clear. In Seattle, Prague or
Washington, D.C., the global networks of NGOs or human-rights activists
have ensured that no stone stayed unturned to show to the world that glob-
alisation needs a human face.
Globalisation is not just an economic phenomenon. It is transforming
many other dimensions of people’s lives. The expansion of telecommuni-
cation technologies is multiplying the contacts between different cultures,
as a result making people much more aware of other ideas, value systems
and ways of life. To illustrate the scope of this expansion, the number of
televisions per thousand people nearly doubled between 1980 (126) and
1995 (204), with a higher annual rate of growth in developing countries
that in developed ones (Arizpe and Alonso, 1999). Meanwhile, between
1980 and 1991 the world trade in ‘cultural goods’ (printed material, liter-
ature, music, radio and television equipment, etc.) almost tripled, going
from $67 to $200 (UNDP, 1999).
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While cultural integration can be very enriching, its current pattern of
organisation (flow of culture and values from rich to poor countries) is dis-
quieting for a majority of people in the developing world. Moreover, the
high level of marketization of culture carries the risk of ‘reducing cultural
concerns to protecting what can be bought and sold, neglecting community,
customs and traditions’ (UNDP, 1999, p. 33).
1.4 The new means of communication
The invention of the Internet in the early 1990s opened a new chapter
in the history of communications and established new bases on which
human beings and organisations could be linked. The notions of time,
space and distance have been revolutionised. Sending a 40-page document
from Madagascar to Abidjan by air would cost an average of US$ 75 (plus
a five-day delay). By fax, the same communication would cost US$ 45 (plus
a 30-minute delay). By email, however, it would only cost 20 US cents, with
a one- to two-minute delay. Similarly, while a three-minute telephone call
from New York to London would have cost US$ 245 in 1930, it only cost
US$ 50 in 1960, US$ 3 in 1990 and less than US cents 50 today.
1.5 The potential benefits of globalisation for developing countries
The process of globalisation opens new and exciting opportunities for
developing countries. First, the increasing exchange of goods, services
and financial resources between developed and developing countries is
expected to lead to a more efficient allocation of world resources as well as
to higher rates of economic growth in all countries. The expansion of
exports from developing countries constitutes a powerful new source of
effective demand and job creation. Meanwhile FDI also has potential pos-
itive effects such expanding technology transfers, increasing production
efficiency through the generation of a more competitive environment and
rising foreign exchange helping to close the balance of payments gap
(South Center, 1997).
Second, the new commercial strategy of TNCs can also work to the
advantage of some developing countries (Evans, 1998). The organisation
of production in geographically dispersed stages gives rise to the reloca-
tion of some industries to developing countries and increases developing
countries’ opportunity to export manufactured goods to the developed
world for the first time in history.
Finally, technological innovations in communications and transport
make it possible to bring critical knowledge to developing countries
faster and cheaper than ever before. Information technology can also
increase the voice of NGOs and other social groups and thus empower
the poor. New technologies make official censorship much harder and
improve the productivity and employment opportunities of unskilled
labour (UNDP, 1999).
Nevertheless, many of these potential benefits have not materialised
so far. While some countries and some segments of the world’s popula-
tion have enjoyed increases in their standard of living, a majority of the
developing world has not experienced a significant rise in their levels of
human development. The negative effects of globalisation and the policy
responses required to eradicate poverty are the issues studied in the rest
of this paper.
2 IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
2.1 Toward a more encompassing definition of poverty
Poverty is a multidimensional notion. In order to capture the multidi-
mensionality of poverty, UNDP introduced the concept of human poverty
in the 1997 Human Development Report. Human poverty is defined as ‘the
denial of choices and opportunities most basic to human development –
to live a long, healthy and creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of
living, freedom, dignity and the respect of other’ (UNDP, 1997).
A key dimension of human poverty is what UNDP calls human securi-
ty. This concept, introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, means
that people can exercise their choices safely and freely, confident that they
will not lose in the future the opportunities that they have today. Human
security has two main aspects: safety from such chronic threats as hunger,
disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful shocks in
the patterns of their daily life (UNDP, 1994).
The concept of human poverty allows us to reconcile the notions of
absolute and relative poverty, to incorporate the notion of vulnerability and
to better identify the real impact of poverty on vulnerable groups such as
women. It has also been used to construct a new measure of poverty, the
Human Poverty Index (HPI), also introduced in the 1997 Human
Development Report (see Box 1.1).
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2.2 Human poverty in the world during the current stage of globalisation
Human poverty has been dramatically reduced in the second half of the
twentieth century. This reduction has been particularly impressive in many
countries of the developing world. For instance, in the last thirty years adult
illiteracy has decreased by nearly half and infant mortality by nearly 60%
(UNDP, 1997). Since 1965, infant mortality has decreased by half while life
expectancy has increased by at least a decade. These trends are reflected in
changes in the HPI between 1970 and 1990 (see Table 3).
The reduction in human poverty has also been accompanied by a
decrease in income poverty. In the developing world, against a background
of rapid population growth, the percentage of people that live with less than
$1 a day declined from 34% to 32% between 1987 and 1993, with a partic-
ular positive performance in some Asian countries (UNDP, 1997).
Despite the success achieved in terms of overall averages, progress was
distributed unevenly throughout the regions of the world in the period
between 1970 and 1990. According to the Human Development Report
1997, during the last three decades Sub-Saharan Africa, China, Latin
America and Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and the CIS experienced
major setbacks in terms of reducing income poverty.
Box 1.1
UNDP’s Human Poverty Index
The HPI tries to incorporate in a composite index the most relevant dimensions
of deprivation in the quality of life: longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of
living and participation. For developing countries, longevity is measured by the per-
centage of people expected to die before age 40 and knowledge by the percentage
of adults who are illiterate. A decent standard of living is represented by a compo-
site of three variables: the percentages of people without access to health services
and without access to safe water, and the percentage of malnourished children
under five. Participation is not measured due to a lack of data. See UNDP (1997).
While the selection of these dimensions and of the corresponding quantitative
indicators is a little arbitrary, it is consistent with the definition of the Human
Development Index and reflects some of the major concerns of the poor. In various
participatory studies done in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the poor included the
following criteria for defining poverty and ill-being: being disabled, lacking econo-
mic assets, being unable to decently bury their dead, having bad housing, being
unable to send their children to school, having food security for only a few months
each year, lacking able-bodied family members who can feed their families in a cri-
sis, etc. See, UNDP (1996, box 2.1).
The situation therefore remains very distressing (all the following
examples come from UNDP, 1997 and 2000).
Although the number of people living with less than $1 a day fell as a
percentage of the total population between 1987 and 1993, it increased in
absolute numbers by 100 million (from 1.2 billion to 1.3 billion). Against
what is maybe a more meaningful income poverty line in today’s world, half
of the world’s population lives on under $2 a day.
In 1997, more than 800 million people did not get enough to eat, more
than 500 million were chronically malnourished and a billion lived without
adequate shelter or in inadequate housing;
In 1998, nearly 15% of people in the developing world did not expect to
survive the age of 40, 27.6% of adults (those 15 years and older) were illit-
erate, 56% did not have access to sanitation and 31% of the children under
five were underweight.
In 1997, 800 million people did not have access to health services and
1,200 million did not access to safe water. There were still 40 million
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Table 3. TRENDS IN THE HPI, 1970-1990 – SELECTED DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Trinidad 8.9 4.1 -3.8
Chile 13.2 5.4 -4.4
Costa Rica 15.0 6.6 -4.0
Argentina 16.7 … …
Panama 17.4 11.1 -2.2
Mauritius 19.4 12.5 -2.2
Peru 28.0 22.8 -1.0
Mexico 29.5 10.9 -4.9
Kuwait 32.0 … …
Thailand 34.3 11.7 -5.2
Sri Lanka 35.3 20.7 -2.6
Source: Rao, 1999a (original source Human Development Report Office,
UNDP).
HPI, 1970 HPI, 1990 annual av.
growth rate
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Table 4. TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY, 1980-1995 – SELECTED
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana ...............................................................................................1988-92 -1.42
Nigeria ..............................................................................................1986-93 0.17
Tanzania ...........................................................................................1977-93 -0.90
Uganda .............................................................................................1989-92 7.31
Zambia .............................................................................................1976-91 -1.05
Zambia .............................................................................................1991-95 4.76
Leshoto .............................................................................................1987-93 0.29
Mauritius..........................................................................................1980-91 -1.98
Asia
Bangladesh.......................................................................................1983-92 -2.65
China ................................................................................................1982-90 2.32
India .................................................................................................1972-77 0.18
India .................................................................................................1977-92 -0.02
Pakistan............................................................................................1979-85 0.06
Pakistan............................................................................................1985-91 -0.67
Sri Lanka..........................................................................................1979-87 1.02
Indonesia..........................................................................................1978-90 -1.27
Malaysia ...........................................................................................1970-89 -0.18
Philippines .......................................................................................1985-91 -0.39
Thailand ...........................................................................................1981-90 1.39
Latin America and Caribbean
Honduras..........................................................................................1987-93 -0.25
Brazil ................................................................................................1981-89 0.91
Chile..................................................................................................1971-89 1.28
Chile..................................................................................................1989-94 0.48
Colombia ..........................................................................................1978-91 -0.46
Costa Rica ........................................................................................1979-86 -0.98
Costa Rica ........................................................................................1986-89 1.03
Dominican Rep. ...............................................................................1984-92 1.56
Guatemala ........................................................................................1979-87 2.00
Jamaica.............................................................................................1988-90 -1.60
Jamaica.............................................................................................1990-93 -3.19
Mexico ..............................................................................................1984-89 1.68
Panama.............................................................................................1979-89 1.48
Peru ..................................................................................................1986-94 0.60
Puerto Rico ......................................................................................1979-89 0.14
Trinid and Tob. ................................................................................1971-81 2.03
Venezuela .........................................................................................1981-90 2.58
Other middle income countries
Egypt ................................................................................................1975-91 -1.07
Greece...............................................................................................1981-88 0.80
Hungary............................................................................................1978-87 1.15
Hungary............................................................................................1987-93 2.46
Jordan...............................................................................................1987-91 3.02
Morocco ...........................................................................................1984-91 0.00
Poland...............................................................................................1980-90 0.54
Poland...............................................................................................1990-93 8.00
Rumania...........................................................................................1989-94 4.16
Tunisia ..............................................................................................1980-90 -0.66
Turkey...............................................................................................1973-87 -1.03
Source: Rao, 1999a.
Period Gini coefficient
annual change
over the period
refugees and internally-displaced people and 25% of the world population
did not live under pluralistic and democratic regimes.
Along with income poverty, the evolution of income inequality has
been much worse and the world today is significantly more unequal than
three decades ago. On the one hand, global inequality between citizens of
different countries has increased substantially: the income gap between
the 20% of the world’s population living in the richest countries and the
20% living in the poorest was 30 to 1 in 1960, 60 to 1 in 1990 and 74 to 1
in 1997 (UNDP, 1999). On the other, between 1989 and 1996 the number
of billionaires increased from 157 to 447; in the latter year the 10 richest
people in the world had a net wealth of $133 billion, more than 1.5 times
the total GDP of all the least-developed countries (UNDP, 1996).
Although many argue that inequality has been reduced in the period
between the 1970s and the1990s, a comparison of the lowest and highest
percentiles reveals that income inequality within many developing coun-
tries has also risen. Table 4 presents the evolution of the Gini coefficient
for a selected group of developing countries. Although many countries are
missing from the data and the periods analysed vary, the table clearly sig-
nals that inequality has not been substantially reduced anywhere in the
world. In only two countries (Bangladesh and Jamaica) did the Gini coef-
ficient decline by more than 2% a year in the periods studied, and in 27
of the 47 observations inequality increased. This increase was particular-
ly large in Uganda, Zambia (in the period 91-95) and Poland (in the peri-
od 90-93), countries where the Gini coefficient grew at an average of more
than 4% a year.
2.3 Links between poverty, inequality and globalisation
While an adequately-managed process of globalisation is likely to
have a positive impact on the poor, the features of the current process
partly explain some of the negative trends in poverty and inequality just
described. So far, globalisation has been a market-driven process. While
it has generously rewarded those with the necessary financial and
human-capital resources, it has harmed many others in at least three dif-
ferent ways. First, globalisation has been an uneven process. Second, it
has increased human insecurity in several spheres. Third, globalisation
has imposed a fiscal squeeze on the state and as a result has limited its
fiscal autonomy.
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a) Uneven features of the process of globalisation
In a market economy, the final distribution of income is determined by
several factors (Figure 3). First, the initial distribution of assets influences
opportunities, whether we are talking of an individual in a society or of a
country in the world economy. If assets (land, labour including human cap-
ital, physical capital and technology) are very unevenly distributed, the
poor will find it very difficult to make even a subsistence income. Second,
the market structure in terms of supply and demand and also of its institu-
tional features brings about the distribution of income between wages and
profits. Finally, state intervention through taxes and especially through
social policy modifies the primary distribution of income.
Figure 3. Distribution of income in a market economy
Globalisation has influenced this process in three different ways. First,
it has led to a worsening in the distribution of initial endowments (particu-
larly physical and human capital and technology) due to its uneven char-
acteristics (data from UNDP, 1999):
In 1997, 58% of FDI went to developed countries, 37% to developing
countries and only 5% to the transition economics of Eastern Europe and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). More than 80% of all the
FDI that went to developing countries during the 1990s went to just 20
countries, most of it to China.
In 1996, around 94% of the portfolio and other short-term capital flows
to the developing world went to just 20 countries. As late as 1999, only 25
developing countries had access to private markets for bonds, commercial
bank loans and portfolio equity.
Globalisation does not extend to unskilled labour. Legislation on migration
is currently much stricter than at the start of the twentieth century and as a
result migration flows are smaller. On the other hand, the mobility of skilled
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labour has increased and developing countries, despite their lack of human
capital, have become exporters of highly-skilled workers (Woodward, 1998).
By the late 1990s, the 20% of the world’s population that lived in the
richest countries had 74% of the world’s telephone lines, while the bottom
20% of the world’s population had only 1.5%.
Technological innovation is also highly concentrated. In 1993, 10 coun-
tries incurred 84% of the world’s spending in research and development.
More than 80% of the patents granted in developing countries belong to cit-
izens of the developed world. The share of research and development done
in developing countries fell from 6% of the world’s total in the mid-1980s to
only 4% in the mid-1990s.
Internet, probably the most important technology of the twenty-first
century, is highly concentrated between and within countries – what is
often referred to as the widening ‘digital divide’: 91% of the world’s Internet
users live in the OECD. Within each country, Internet is primarily used by
upper-income, educated, English-speaking groups.
Second, the terms of trade have moved against developing countries and
real wages for unskilled labour have remained stagnant. As a result, the pri-
mary distribution of income is still highly unequal both at the national and
international levels. Some data is very useful to illustrate these three trends:
In 1992, 56% of world trade took place between developed countries
and 77% of developed countries’ imports came from other developed coun-
tries (Milberg, 1998). UNCTAD data shows that Africa’s share of global trade
has fallen from 3.22% in 1950 to only 0.95%.
The terms of trade of non-fuel commodities with respect to manufac-
tures fell from 147 in 1980 to 100 in 1985, 80 in 1990 and 71 in 1992. The
decline was even larger in the late 1990s: according to UNCTAD, from the
end of 1996 to February 1998 oil commodity prices fell by 16.4% while non-
oil ones fell by 33.8% (cited in Chord, 1999). This negative evolution of the
terms of trade is caused by a conjunction of factors: low income-elasticity
of demand for exports from developing countries, the undifferentiated
nature of those goods and their high level of substitution, etc. The problem
for developing countries is that many of the manufactures in which they
have a comparative advantage share some of the characteristics of primary
goods (Woodward, 1998).
Almost all countries that implemented liberalisation policies experi-
enced an increase in raw labour earning inequalities in the late 1980s and
1990s. Only a few countries (Malaysia, Indonesia) were able to compensate
this trend with a shift in the employment structure in favour of high-wage
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skilled jobs and as a result did not witness an overall increase in inequality
(Galbraith, Darity and Jiaquing, 1998).
Third, during the last two decades participation in the global markets has
been restricted to a limited number of countries. The resulting governance
asymmetry has also contributed to increased human poverty. Poor and vul-
nerable groups and countries have been further marginalized because of
non-participatory and non-democratic practices in global governance.
Non-participatory mechanisms in the global governance of trade, for exam-
ple, led to agreements such as the TRIPS and the TRIMS that work to the
disadvantage of the poor in developing countries.
b) Globalisation increases human insecurity
The effects of globalisation on poor countries and poor people go
beyond the reduction in their opportunities in the market. Equally or even
more important for human poverty has been globalisation’s impact on
human security. The 1999 Human Development Report argues that globali-
sation has increased the level of human insecurity in several spheres:
Job and income insecurity. The liberalisation of the current and capital
accounts and the deregulation of the labour market have led to corporate
restructuring, heavy job losses and a deterioration of working conditions in
many countries. The increasing expansion of new technologies has also
rendered many people’s skills obsolete.
In Latin America, for example, the share of workers without contracts
or with less secure contracts reached 30% in Chile, 36% in Argentina, 39%
in Columbia and 41% in Peru by 1996. Similarly, informal employment
expanded in the 1990s from 52% to 58%. 85% of the new jobs created in the
subcontinent were informal (UNDP, 1999).
Financial volatility and crisis. The elimination of most restrictions on
short-term financial flows in the world economy has greatly increased both
the likelihood of financial crisis and the contagion effect from one set of
countries to the rest of the world.
The last round of financial crisis that started in Southeast Asia and
extended later to Brazil, Russia and other developing countries demon-
strated the volatility of short-term capital flows and the potentially desta-
bilising economic and social effects of financial liberalisation. The after-
math of the crisis also showed the high human costs of financial shocks,
especially for the poor (UNDP, 1999):
Bankruptcies multiplied, especially among small businesses;
Poverty and unemployment rose. Poverty increased in Korea and
Taiwan. In Indonesia, an additional 40 million people (20% of the popula-
tion) fell into poverty. Unemployment rose by 0.3 million in Malaysia, 0.5
million in Thailand, 1 million in Indonesia and 1.5 million in Korea.
Schooling fell. In Thailand, for example, it is estimated that 100,000
children are not pursuing either primary or secondary school because of
the crisis.
The reduction in public services and the increase in social distress and
fragmentation have worsened the human conditions of low-income groups.
The negative effects of economic shocks on the poor have not been
experienced only by Asian countries. During periods of economic crisis in
Latin America in the last two decades, Altimir (1998, p. 155) argues that
‘increasing inequality [was] associated with deep falls of real wages and
staggering increases in the under-utilization of the urban labour force’.
During subsequent recoveries ‘neither the previous level of real wage nor
the degree of productive (i.e. formal) employment was completely restored’.
Personal insecurity. In the last few years, crime has grown and become
global. There are currently 200 million drug users in the world, the traffic
of illegal weapons is increasing, about half a million women and girls from
developing countries are forcefully and illegally taken to Western Europe,
etc. The organised crime syndicates that are behind most of these opera-
tions disturb the lives of millions of people in both developed and develop-
ing countries. They have also become a major economic power in the world
economy with revenues of around $1.5 trillion a year (UNDP, 1999).
Health insecurity. Spreading dramatically fast, AIDS affects an increas-
ing number of poor people. In 1998, of the more than 33 million people
infected by HIV, 95% lived in the developing world. The consequences of
HIV/AIDS for some countries are terrible: for example, ten African coun-
tries project a loss of 17 years in life expectancy by 2010 as a result of the
growing presence of the virus (UNDP, 1999).
Environmental insecurity. Export-led growth in developing countries
and the increasing transport of goods around the world have increased pol-
lution and put great pressure on natural resources. Environmental degra-
dation has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor. In 1997 and
1998, the storms El Niño and La Niña, which many scientists believe are
caused by global warming, left 22,000 people dead, injured 118 million peo-
ple, displaced nearly 5 million and caused world-wide costs estimated at
$33 billion.
Political and community insecurity. Civil conflicts have become the
dominant type of war in the last few decades. Of the 61 armed struggles
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that the world witnessed between 1989 and 1998, only three were between
different countries (UNDP, 1999). Civil wars affect poor people because
they leave a high number of civilian casualties and generate a very large
number of displaced citizens. In 1995, for example, there were 46 million
displaced people. Only 6 million of them lived in developed or transition
economies (UNDP, 1997).
Current armed conflicts benefit business interests. Private companies
such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline International and Military
Professional Resources Incorporated offer military and training services to
many countries, particularly in Africa (UNDP, 1999). These businesses, very
difficult to regulate, have clearly benefited from the process of globalisation.
c) Globalisation and the fiscal squeeze
Globalisation has caused a fiscal squeeze in public budgets through
both the spending and, especially, the revenue side. As a result, govern-
ments find it very difficult to dedicate enough resources to social services
and anti-poverty programmes.
The reduction in government revenues during the 1980s was particular-
ly large in low income countries, where tax revenues as percentage of GDP
fell from 15.3% in the first half of the 80s to 13.3% in the first half of the 90s.
Tax revenues also fell in upper-middle income countries, from 21% to 20.2%
during the same period (Mohan Rao, 1999b). Four different factors, highly
associated with globalisation, explain this evolution (Grunberg, 1998):
Trade liberalisation has given rise to a fall in tax revenues from foreign
trade. Trade taxes fell from 40.8% of total tax revenues in low-income
countries, 31.9% in lower-middle income countries and 20.8% in upper
middle countries in the period 1970-1975 to 32.2%, 20.3% and 15.9%
respectively in the early 1990s. An increase in indirect taxes only partly
alleviated the income gap caused by this reduction (see table 5), and that
at the cost of leading many countries to a more complex and regressive
tax structure.
Globalisation of the tax base: the increasing weight of TNCs in the world
economy has rendered many tax systems obsolete. Adapting them to the
new global conditions, however, is not easy because foreign income is very
difficult to track and companies can often avoid taxes through transfer pric-
ing and other tax-planning techniques. In fact, empirical studies have
shown that firms systematically post a higher rate of return on average in
countries with low tax rates than in countries with high tax rates
(Grunberg, 1998).
Countries engage in tax competition to attract foreign capital. Many
developing countries have created free trade zones. These now produce a
large share of the country’s manufactures but make only a marginal con-
tribution to tax revenues.
Globalisation has been accompanied by an expansion of the informal
economy. India’s underground economy is estimated at 20% of GDP, com-
parable in size to the national economies of Chile, Colombia, Nigeria and
Kenya (UNDP, 1999). At the same time, a 1980 study of Indonesia estimat-
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Table 5. TAX STRUCTURE IN THE WORLD
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 26.1 2.0 29.3 40.8
1976-80 25.2 2.5 28.3 39.3
1981-85 25.5 2.4 32.0 37.0
1986-90 27.0 1.6 33.5 35.1
1991-95 25.4 1.3 37.8 32.2
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 29.9 4.8 26.7 31.9
1976-80 30.4 7.6 24.0 30.0
1981-85 32.8 8.1 25.0 25.5
1986-90 32.0 8.4 28.6 23.3
1991-95 32.7 7.1 33.9 20.3
UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
1970-75 36.7 13.7 24.5 20.8
1976-80 42.4 11.5 24.8 17.0
1981-85 36.5 14.1 30.3 15.7
1986-90 29.5 16.8 31.1 18.2
1991-95 32.4 14.8 33.8 15.9
Source: Mohan Rao (1999b).
Dir Taxes Soc.Secur. Dom.Indir. Trade
% of Total Tax Revenue
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ed tax evasion at 84-94% of income tax and 76-93% of corporate tax
(Grunberg, 1998).
This revenue squeeze has coincided with increasing pressures on the
spending side of the budget. The expansion of unemployment due to struc-
tural change, the need for a more educated labour force, the competition for
foreign capital through investment incentives, the need to support national
firms through subsidies and transfers, and the cost of sterilising capital
inflows have all dramatically increased the demand for state intervention.
The result of this evolution is that ‘the fiscal basis of constructive state
action to promote human development and resolve the distributive conflict
is now more limited than ever before’ (Mohan Rao, 1999b, p. 357). Creating
a broader and more efficient tax system and more efficiently allocating
public resources have thus become urgent tasks if countries are to over-
come the fiscal squeeze and manage globalisation in favour of the poor.
2.4 The impact of globalisation on vulnerable groups: gender and human
poverty.
Globalisation has had a particularly profound impact on the most vul-
nerable groups in society, children and women. Both groups suffer more
from the uneven character of the process of globalisation. In fact, globali-
sation has been accompanied by a growing ‘feminisation of poverty’. The
number of rural women living in poverty, for example, has risen by nearly
50% in the last two decades (UNDP, 1995).
Women have consistently been ignored by the expansion of credit and
technological innovations brought about by globalisation. In India, only 11%
of borrowers in the major banks are women. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, they constitute only 7 to 11% of the beneficiaries of credit pro-
grams. The situation is even more sombre in the rural sector. In many African
countries, women produce around 80% of the food but receive less than 10%
of the credit to small farmers and 1% of the total credit to agriculture (UNDP,
1995). At the same time, women also have a limited access to new technolo-
gies. They account for only 25% of Internet users in Brazil, 17% in South
Africa, 16% in Russia, 7% in China and 4% in the Arab states (UNDP, 1999).
Financial crises and economic shocks also tend to affect women and
young people disproportionately. In Korea, between April 1997 and April
1998, employment declined by 7.1% for women compared with only 3.8% for
men. The number of unemployed among those aged 15 to 29 doubled from
0.3 to 0.6 million (UNDP, 1999). In Latin America, the World Bank found out
that ‘in adjustment episodes the hourly earnings of women declined even
more dramatically than those of men, partly because women were concen-
trated in hard-hit low-paying sectors such as apparel’ (cited in Çagatay, 1998).
Globalisation, however, has also had some positive effects on women,
especially in terms of their access to formal labour markets. A study of 165
countries for the years 1985 and 1990 by Çagatay and Özler (1995) finds that
trade liberalisation has led to an expansion of the female share of employ-
ment. Two other studies by Özler at plant-level in Turkey and Colombia
show that industries with a high ratio of exports to output employ a larger
fraction of women than other industries (cited in Özler, 1999).
In principle, the feminisation of the labour force allows women greater
control over income within the household and as a result increases their bar-
gaining power (Çagatay, 1998). Unfortunately, formal employment has often
not been accompanied by a reduction in the number of hours women spend
in unpaid jobs. In Bulgaria, for example, men’s share of household work actu-
ally decreased from 52% of that of women in 1977 to 48% in 1988. In
Bangladesh, women currently work an average of 87 hours per week (31 of
which in the household) against 67 for men (of which 14 in the household)
(UNDP, 1999). This does not only deteriorate women’s living conditions but
also reduces their ability to provide care services within the family.
A second problem with the role of women in the labour market is that
they still suffer substantial discrimination in terms of wages and job secu-
rity. In developing countries, female wages average only 75% of men’s, and
a substantial number of women remain in the informal sector (e.g. 43% of
women workers in Korea and 71% in Indonesia) (UNDP, 2000b). In fact,
the gender gap has been a key component of the growth strategy of many
countries, especially in Asia. Women’s low wages have ‘stimulated export
sales, providing the foreign exchange necessary for these economies to pur-
sue their import-substitution and modernisation programs’ (Seguino, 2000,
p. 51). In a cross-country study of twenty semi-industrialised export-ori-
ented countries, Seguino (2000b) demonstrates that GDP growth is posi-
tively correlated with the gender wage gap.
These recent negative trends adding to their secular backwardness,
women remain in a precarious situation with respect to men. This is espe-
cially clear when the problem is analysed from a human-poverty perspec-
tive instead of using only income-based indicators. As Table 6 clearly
shows, the adult literacy rate for men in developing countries is still more
than 25% higher than for women and men’s average income is twice that of
women’s. Moreover, women have fewer opportunities to improve their
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human capital or to participate in the political process. In fact, in only five
developing countries do women occupy more than 30% of the parliamen-
tary seats, and in 31 they occupy less than 5%.
Gender inequality is more than a very serious problem in itself because
it is a central cause of human poverty. As the 1997 Human Development
Report shows, gender inequality in both economic and political terms is
strongly correlated with human poverty. In fact, norms about child mar-
riage of girls, gender bias in education and geographical mobility, wage
inequality between men and women, etc. constitute a powerful barrier in
the effort to prevent the transmission of human deprivation from one gen-
eration to the next (Çagatay, 1998).
2.5 The special case of Africa
Africa faces multiple challenges with respect to globalisation. These
challenges are first and foremost economic and commercial, related to
Africa’s place in the commercial and investment flows. These challenges are
also technological. If the explosion of technological solutions is often pre-
sented as both the decisive factor and the defining symbol of globalisation,
the analysis reveals that Africa is way behind other regions of the world on
both counts. These challenges are often political and cultural, deriving from
the new configuration of the world for which it is clear Africa has not been
well prepared. Finally, thanks to globalisation, Africa has seen appear or
spread new threats such as the AIDS epidemic, organised crime or envi-
ronmental degradation.
a) Economic and commercial challenges (growth, trade, investment)
In general, the 1990s have not granted Africa an equal share in the ben-
efits of global economic expansion. Despite improved performance, annu-
al GDP growth rates in African countries as a whole rarely exceeded 3%
between 1990 and 1997. Because of demographic expansion, the growth rate
for per capita GDP was negative over the period.
Admittedly, this overall evaluation hides diverse results, some encour-
aging, some less. In 11 countries, growth reached or exceeded the 6% tar-
get of the UN’s New Agenda for Africa’s Development. A number of coun-
tries, including Mauritius, Kenya, Senegal, Cameroon and South Africa
have initiated a process of export diversification, while others, such as
Cape Verde, Seychelles, Lesotho or Mozambique have increased their
income from private transfers and the exportation of services.
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Nonetheless, it remains that, over the last decade, the growth of GDP
across sub-Saharan Africa did not reach sufficient levels to reverse the
trends of poverty. What is more, Africa increasingly appears as the conti-
nent where poverty in all its guises, be it financial or human, is here to stay.
In parallel to this weak economic performance, Africa did not improve
its participation in world trade. In 1997, Africa’s share of world trade
remained below 2%, confirming an age-old decline. Between 1990 and
1998, world exports as a percentage of world GDP increased 21% as against
0.4% for Africa’s exports. The proportion is reversed for imports: over the
same period, world imports as a proportion of world GDP increased 15%
while Africa’s increased 24%. If Africa’s international trade figures indicate
a high level of integration into the world economy – almost equal to that of
Latin America – that integration takes a very passive form, led by imports.
Comparing the economic performance of Asia and Africa, particularly
sub-Saharan Africa shows how, as early as the late 1970s, their external per-
formance constituted the main element of differentiation. During the first
two decades after independence, and following – already – the prescriptions
of ‘experts’, African countries believed they could industrialise ‘by the boot-
straps’ through substituting imports costly in foreign exchange by a nation-
al production subsidised and protected, and by exporting only raw agricul-
tural and mineral products.
The disastrous outcome of these policies is a matter of record, illustrat-
ed by the performance of a few African countries. Between 1965 and 1995,
the average annual rate of export growth was 5% in Côte d’Ivoire, 2.5% in
Kenya, 2% in Nigeria, minus 1.5% in Ghana, minus 4% in Zimbabwe and
minus 5% in South Africa, while it reached 16% in South Korea, 11% in
Malaysia and 8% in Indonesia. The performance lag was even more pro-
nounced after the start of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990, the average
annual growth rate in the export of goods and services by sub-Saharan
Africa was 2%, reaching 2.5% between 1985 and 1990 – as against 8.5% and
13.5% respectively for south-east Asia.
Africa also failed to graduate from the export of primary products to that
of manufactured products – the only recognised way to offer durable pro-
tection on the world markets. Asia is the case study of success in this trans-
formation. In 1965, the share of manufactured products in the exports of
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand was below 6%. In 1992, it reached 41%,
61% and 77% respectively. Nonetheless, the relative share of the primary
sector in African exports remains very high, almost 68% on average over
the period 1988-1995, indicating the difficulty African countries face when
trying to diversify their exports so as to position themselves against sectors
promising more profitable terms of trade.
Even the traditional sector of primary agricultural products is not Africa’s
strong point anymore. Africa’s competitive positions have progressively
eroded in such markets as cocoa, coffee, rubber, spices or vegetable oils – to
the benefit of countries such as, again, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia.
Africa’s position is as weak on the private international investment mar-
ket as it is in the international trade market. The flows of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) to Africa remain limited compared to those reaching
other parts of the world, even if they are relatively high (around 19%) in
relation to Africa’s GDP. The total FDI to Africa amounted to US$ 5.4 bil-
lion in 1998 – less than one percent of what irrigated the world economy –
and this share remained practically constant throughout the decade. In
addition, FDI in Africa is concentrated in the mining and oil sectors, and
benefits primarily a handful of countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco,
Angola, Tunisia, Ghana and South Africa.
The result has been increased poverty in Africa. First, and according to
UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Report 2000, economic performance in
the second half of the 1990s was very poor across most of the continent,
especially in the last 3 years of the decade. Overall, output growth in Africa
was less than 3% per year over the period. Between 1985 and 1998, average
per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa declined by 0.15% per year (HDR
1999), with the decline reaching 0.4% between 1990 and 1998. Since
income inequality, measured by Gini coefficients increased during the same
period in most Sub-Saharan African countries, this means an absolute
increase in income poverty.
Indeed, income poverty numbers show a similar trend. The percentage
of people living below $1.00 a day in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) increased
from 47.67 in 1987 to 48.53 in 1996 (1993 Purchasing Power Parity). In
absolute numbers, the number of people living below the same poverty line
in SSA increased from 217 millions in 1987 to 290 millions in 1998. As of
1993, the SSA region had the world’s highest ratio of people living in pover-
ty. On average, during the 1990s, almost 76% of SSA’s population lived on
less than $2 a day.
According to the Human Development Report 1997, sub-Saharan Africa
was the only region in the world where many components of human
poverty increased during the 1990s. For example, the number of people not
expected to survive to the age of 40 increased by 30% in that period. During
1991-95, SSA was the only region of the world to register a decline in its real
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consumption growth rate, -1.3% during the period, with the annual average
growth rate of consumption not expected to exceed 0.1% during 1997-2000.
The World Bank’s Trends in Poverty report states that primary school
enrolment rates in SSA remained stagnant between 1982 and 1994, while
other regions experienced improvements. Similarly, while infant mortal-
ity rates improved modestly, continuing poor health conditions and the
large numbers of people living with HIV/AIDS (23 millions) were reflect-
ed in health indicators: of the eight countries in the world which record-
ed declines in life expectancy of more than three years, six were in
Africa.
b) The technological challenges
Africa has long been known for lagging behind in the acquisition and
mastery of modern technology. This distance has been growing and now
takes on crisis proportions in the face of globalisation, because Africa had
only just started getting used to traditional technologies when it had to face
the jump to the new ones.
Despite considerable progress these last few years, basic communica-
tions equipment are still missing in Africa. While Canada boasts of 600
phone lines per 1000 inhabitants and France of 560, Togo only has 6,
Mauritania 4, Niger 2 and Mozambique 3. Thailand has more cell phones
than all of Africa, while at the rate it is developing its own phone system,
Côte d’Ivoire will not reach Germany’s present equipment level before 2050.
The same picture applies to television. In 1997, while the US had 800 TV
sets for every 1000 inhabitants, Italy and Austria had 500, the Central
African Republic had 6, Guinea 8 and Uganda 26. The same picture again
for personal computers or fax machines.
Where the gap becomes terrifying is with regard to the Internet. Less
than 0.2% of Africans use the net, as against 30% of Americans, 20% of
Singaporeans and 40% of Icelanders. Bulgaria alone has more Internet
‘surfers’ than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa! One reason is that the cost
of access to the net is 10 times greater for an African than for an American.
Admittedly, all LDCs are falling behind in investment: today, 55 countries
account for as much as 99% of the entire world’s expenditure on informa-
tion technology. However, Africa’s real problem is that the challenge of
modern technologies is more than a matter of acquisition cost. It derives
from the difficulty of preparing the average African to take advantage of the
technology. In Africa, illiteracy and the uneven distribution of technical
resources – telephones exist primarily in the cities and using a computer
requires the ability to read and write – effectively limit the distribution pos-
sibilities.
These numbers well illustrate the technological handicap that the
African continent must overcome to partake of globalisation. On top of it,
Africa faces political and cultural obstacles that are no less daunting.
c) The political and cultural challenges
For Africa, globalisation means a new world political order where the
traditional network of relations based on ideological proximity within an
East-West conflict has been superseded by a new international distribution
mechanism based on new criteria. In addition, the new international space
that is shaping up carries risks to which Africa is particularly vulnerable.
These risks are tied to the new cultural vulnerability of the continent, to its
powerlessness in the face of scourges such as AIDS or the new forms of
criminality.
i) A new world political order
The comfort of the East-West confrontation has been replaced by a
unipolar world. As a result, the ideological considerations that offered so
many African countries a perfect sinecure and the cover for all blunders
do not apply anymore. Suddenly, all traditional geopolitical markers have
vanished.
International development co-operation is one of the areas in which
this transformation has been most obvious. The opening of Eastern Europe
has created a new competitive environment for the resources of official
development assistance (ODA) where the allocation criteria have become
management excellence and adhesion to the new dogma. As a result, the
flows of ODA to Africa decreased in the course of the 1990s from US$ 16
billion in 1992 to US$ 12.5 billion in 1998 or, in dollar per capita terms,
from US$ 36.4 in 1992 to US$ 21.4 in 1998.
At the same time, the concepts of democracy and good governance,
long held hostage to the East-West confrontation, have suddenly come of
age, to the extent that they now dominate the international political dis-
course. In practical terms, they have become additional conditionalities for
ODA, defining the criteria on the basis of which international sympathy can
now be secured. Behind this evolution lies the emergence of a finely-honed
civil society, connected to an aggressive global network and whose irrup-
tion on the political scene has occasionally upset the balance of already
weakened societies.
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Since the La Baule summit, francophone African countries have been
subject to multiple pressures: invited without preparation to free their polit-
ical spaces, resume universal suffrage, and enforce a state of law against
historical, social or cultural backgrounds resistant to rapid transforma-
tions. To make matters worse, these transformations are eagerly awaited at
the very moment when the difficult economic reforms imposed from out-
side call for sacrifices the populations are reluctant to accept.
These are the political circumstances of Africa’s globalisation. One
must rejoice that, despite this initial lack of preparation, African coun-
tries have accepted democratisation. Ghana most recently added to the
constantly-growing list of countries going through a peaceful transfor-
mation. Let us not underestimate, however, how much this wind of
change will require in terms of time, energy and experimentation – not to
mention a solid dose of errors – before it fully takes hold. Africa will need
this breathing space all the more because, beside a number of positive
changes, new political shoals are emerging across the continent, often
rooted in the difficulty of reaching a peaceful sharing of power.
Civil wars are one such example. In a way, from Sierra Leone to Angola,
from Guinea-Bissau to the two Congos, Africa’s people are paying the price
of the difficulties of imposing the principles of democratic governance in
environments where mindsets have been slow to evolve. Unfortunately,
globalisation has given these conflicts a new flavour.
In the first place, nowadays, interests at stake and actors involved both
often reach beyond the strict limits of the national borders. Foreign hands –
states, multinational corporations, businessmen – increasingly derive income
from national tragedies, whether they aim for political hegemony or for the
lucrative control of natural resources such as diamonds. In addition, more
and more ‘war professionals’ willingly get paid to become actors in conflicts,
whether they are mercenaries from the former Soviet empire left unemployed
by the fall of the Berlin wall or former quasi-official services such as South
Africa’s Executive Outcomes looking for a new line of business.
While overcoming the political shock has become vital for Africa, doing
so without compromising its cultural identity has also become a major
challenge faced by the continent because of globalisation.
ii) A new culture shock
The explosion in the number of means of communication and infor-
mation has created a ‘global village’ where the welding of ideas and culture
is a dominant characteristic. However, far from the hoped-for mutual
enrichment, there has emerged a new cultural imperialism, propagated by
the audio-visual industry and in which northern lifestyles and behaviour
become the norm.
Culture has become an economic and commercial good that can be
exported, and as for all other exportable goods, market shares are not equi-
tably shared. Hollywood produces fewer movies than India’s ‘Bollywood’,
but it still controls 70% of the European movie market, 83% of Latin
America’s and half that of Japan.
As in other competitions, Africa finds itself in a position of inferiority.
African cultures, already weakened by centuries of colonisation, are hard
put to resist the pressures of fashions and behaviours that are dominant in
other regions. Young people from poor African countries discover shoe
brands like Nike or Adidas before they discover those manufactured local-
ly. They end up knowing their way around California’s suburbs before they
finish visiting their own country. What is worse, lifestyles idolised by over-
seas series propagate behaviours that are foreign to the local culture or give
birth to needs or dreams that cannot be satisfied locally – all sources of
frustration and copycat violence.
This pressure on African cultures is evolving in the broader context of
the advance of many new threats that it is difficult not to associate with
globalisation. Among these are diseases like AIDS, developments like
organised crime or money laundering, or the various scourges destroying
the environment.
iii) The shock of new threats
Whether simple coincidence or an actual causality link, globalisation also
means for Africa the emergence and spread of new diseases like AIDS. If the
origins of the disease cannot be linked to the economic phenomenon called
globalisation, it cannot be denied that its rapid spread has been facilitated by
the integration of nations, in particular the cross-border movement of people.
Every minute, 11 people contract the virus that causes AIDS. In the
space of a few years, Africa has become the continent with the largest num-
ber of AIDS victims. Today, 23 of the 33 million people living with AIDS live
in Africa. As it decimates the most active age groups, AIDS has also become
a development tragedy that seriously mortgages the chances of economic
take-off for many African countries. The nine African countries where the
seroprevalence rate is above 10% (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have already lost
all the life expectancy gains realised since 1960.
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Globalisation also presents a fertile ground for organised crime. Better
than anyone, organised crime understood the benefits it could derive from
globalisation. Deregulation in the capital markets, breakthroughs in infor-
mation and communications technologies, a greater freedom of move-
ments for goods and people mean an environment more favourable than
ever for the movement of illegal drugs, sex workers and arms and ammu-
nition, as well as for money laundering.
Let us admit it: Africa is particularly vulnerable to these threats. Bank
supervision is weak and, with transparency rare in the capital markets,
money laundering is taking on worrying proportions. Africa’s borders are
porous and the human and capital resources needed to control them are
scarce. Africa’s judiciaries and polices lack the means of investigation nec-
essary for effective repression – when they do not suffer from widespread
corruption. Young Africans, teenage girls in particular, tortured by poverty
and lack of prospects, become easy prey for all kinds of criminals eager to
make them fall into drugs and prostitution. Africa’s capitals become
favoured destinations for cars stolen in Europe or in America, or for arms
and ammunition feeding sub-regional conflicts.
Finally, the environmental consequences of globalisation are extremely
damaging for the African continent. The world-wide impact of industriali-
sation on global warming through hothouse gasses spares no corner of the
planet. Here again, however, Africa is more vulnerable than other continents
to the pressure that the globalised economy imposes on the environment.
African forests are the least protected and the most subject to anarchic
exploitation. In addition, until recently, afforestation did not rank high on
national priority lists. If the wood industry, particularly that of rare species,
is a great foreign-exchange earner for African countries, it also constitutes
the main agent of destruction for their forests and ecosystems. Countries
like Gabon or the Congo were recently obliged to take forceful measures to
ensure that future generations enjoy a healthy environment still rich in for-
est resources, while the most optimistic assessments estimate that both
countries have lost more than 40% of the forest cover they enjoyed in 1970.
Africa also falls victim to the most devastating effects of global warming
and rising sea levels. Egypt expects to lose up to 12% of its land area to the
rise in sea levels. Mozambique recently suffered two consecutive bouts of
the most disastrous floods of its modern history.
When to all of this is added the wholesale rape of Africa’s fishing resources
along both its coasts, the scope of the environmental challenges faced by
Africa because of the globalisation of the economy becomes all too apparent.
Long as it may be, this list does not attempt to present a comprehensive
picture of the multiple challenges which globalisation is throwing at Africa.
It does, however, help throw light on the urgency, for Africans as well as for
the international community, of conceiving and putting into place a well-
thought out strategy.
That goes beyond the special case of Africa, as it is now widely admit-
ted that the greatest challenge the international community is facing today
is to manage globalisation in favour of the poor.
3. MANAGING GLOBALISATION IN FAVOUR OF THE POOR
Despite some of the negative trends just described, globalisation can
contribute decisively to the eradication of poverty and the construction of
a more equal world. In order to do that, however, the process has to be
managed correctly and the right balance between market forces and gov-
ernment intervention has to be reached.
Many measures will be required to eliminate the uneven character of
globalisation, increase human security and improve the ability of the state
to provide goods and services for the poor. This will require revisiting some
of the policy prescriptions that have constituted the bulk of transformative
reform these recent years. It will also require a different commitment from
the international community and the multilateral development agencies.
3.1 Agenda for reform
a) Increase the benefits from trade and capital flows
A large body of empirical evidence shows that trade liberalisation by itself
does not necessarily lead to export expansion or to higher rates of economic
growth. The relationship between trade openness and poverty eradication is
even fuzzier. Openness should be interpreted from the point of view of human
development rather than market access. In order to benefit from openness in
trade in terms of SHD and sustainable poverty eradication, countries need to
implement a comprehensive package, which includes sound macroeconomic
management with poverty eradication and social fairness as its success indi-
cators, good infrastructure and social services, and strong governance (both
economic and political) with an appropriate institutional framework that is
geared towards human development (UNDP, 1999).
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The experience of the Republic of Korea in this realm is particularly
illuminating. From 1960 to 1997 Korea enjoyed one of the highest rates of
economic growth and improved human development simultaneously.
Some of the key elements of Korea’s success were a growth strategy with
bold economic reforms; institutions responsive to the market but con-
trolled by the state; land reform; implementation of labour-intensive tech-
nologies; and an active industrial policy to introduce the country in new
niches in the world market. All of these policies took place within the par-
ticular structure of state-society relations that Peter Evans (1995) described
with the term ‘embedded autonomy’.
In order to be sustainable, experiences such as that of the Republic of
Korea must be combined with the pro-poor growth strategies. This point is
discussed further below.
In particular, capital inflows have to be carefully managed. First, coun-
tries should design comprehensive plans to attract long-term investment.
Such plans should include a stable political climate, an educated labour
force, active technological policies, and clear priorities on what sectors FDI
should go to and incentives for domestic firms. Second, developing coun-
tries should tightly control the speculative movements of short-term capi-
tal to influence both their volume and their composition.
b) Overcome the resource squeeze and increase the fiscal autonomy of the
state through a new approach to macroeconomic policy
While markets are a fairly efficient mechanism for resource allocation,
states should also play an active role in the promotion of growth and in the
consolidation of a more equitable distribution of income. These two objec-
tives require confronting the fiscal squeeze and adopting a new approach
to macroeconomic policy.
Raising increased public revenues is a necessary condition to over-
coming the fiscal squeeze, whether through increasing direct taxes (income
and property taxes) which are still extremely low in most developing coun-
tries, or through introducing a value-added tax (emphasising its progressive
aspects). Simplifying the tax laws and increasing the efficiency of the tax
administration should also be implemented as soon as possible.
For the state to succeed in eradicating human poverty, macroeconomic
policy can no longer be based on the approach Amartya Sen called ‘anti-deficit
radicalism’ that separates economic and social policies. Instead, countries
need to adopt a ‘transformational approach’ to macroeconomics. As Çagatay
and Elson state (2000, p.1348) this approach argues that the “ ‘soundness’ of
macroeconomic policy would be judged not on market-based criteria ‘per se’,
but in terms of whether they ultimately succeed in bring societies closer to
achieving social justice. Thus, desire social outcomes… become the ultimate
goals of policy-making, including macroeconomic-policy making”.
From this perspective, macroeconomic policies must have a profound
democratic content and be determined through an active process of partic-
ipation by all social groups. A key instrument to encourage participation
and channel it effectively is the people-centred budget initiatives. The main
goal of such initiatives is to ‘come up with reprioritisation of both expendi-
tures and revenue-raising methods in order to promote social justice’
(Çagatay, Keklik, Lal and Lang, 2000, p. 14).
People-centred budget initiatives can be classified into two categories:
social impact analysis and audits; and the preparation of people-centred budg-
ets. While the former are used to determine the effect of the actual budget on
income and gender equality and on poverty, the latter try to substitute or com-
plement the current allocation of public revenues and expenditures (Çagatay,
Keklik, Lal and Lang, 2000, from a detailed analysis of people-centered
budget experiences in India, Bangladesh, Canada and Port Alegre in Brazil).
The adoption of a people-centred budget will contribute to allocating
public spending to activities that favour a majority of the population and
promote participation, accountability and transparency. As a result, it will
help overcome the fiscal squeeze and will increase the political power of the
poor. In fact, the adoption of a model of participatory budgeting seems to be
one of the main reasons for the dramatic expansion of municipal revenues
in the city of Port Alegre (Brazil) (Çagatay, Keklik, Lal and Lang, 2000).
c) Generate pro-poor growth
Economic growth per se is not sufficient to result in an expansion of
human development and a substantial reduction in human poverty.
Countries such as Egypt and Pakistan, for example, experienced annual
rates of per capita income growth of more than 3% between 1985 and 1997
(UNDP, 1999) but did not advance significantly on the road to human devel-
opment.
Developing countries need to adopt a strategy of ‘pro-poor growth’. Pro-
poor growth takes place when the poor’s per capita income is growing
faster than the average national income and, even better, when the absolute
number of poor people is being reduced by growth (UNDP, 2000b).
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As the experience of China in the early 1980s, Vietnam in the 1990s and
Malaysia and Taiwan (province of China) before the financial crisis show, a
pro-growth strategy should include the following measures:
Restore full employment, putting emphasis in the promotion of labour-
intensive industries.
Reorient social spending especially in education, to expand the capabil-
ities of the poor.
Promote micro-enterprises and the informal sector and increase the
productivity of small-scale agriculture.
Provide the poor with means to save, to access to credit and to start a
small business. Promoting micro-finance schemes has proven to be an effi-
cient way to empower the poor and increase their ability to save and invest.
Micro-finance, however, has not been as successful in helping poor people
start new businesses, and additional measures are needed to promote
micro-enterprises.
The reduction of human poverty in the developing world is highly
improbable if the inequality in the distribution of initial assets and final
income is not substantially reduced. In order to do that, countries should
make an effort to make taxation more progressive, provide income trans-
fers, increase spending in education and assure a democratic access to
credit and other productive resources. None of these measures, however,
will be effective unless there is a concurrent, dramatic restructuring of
many public programmes aimed at eliminating their often regressive
nature and concentrating resources on those with progressive effects (see
table 7 for the case of education in some countries).
d) Set targets and design programmes for poverty reduction
Countries should follow the 1995 Social Summit’s recommendations
and implement ‘national poverty eradication plans’ to address ‘the structur-
al causes of poverty’ (cited in UNDP, 2000b, p. 32). Anti-poverty plans are
needed to build a consensus for socio-economic change and determine how
many resources are required to eliminate poverty and where should they
come from.
On 8 September 2000, the largest gathering of Heads of State ever met
in New York for the United Nations Millennium Summit. The Summit was
the culmination of hundreds of millennium-related events on the future of
the global system, involving members of civil society, religious leaders, par-
liamentarians, youth, the business community and scholars. Reflecting on
commitments made during the UN conferences in the 1990s, including the
1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, the world
leaders reaffirmed their strong convictions in the UN Millennium
Declaration by stating.
‘We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children
from the abject and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty, to which
more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to
making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the
entire human race from want. We resolve therefore to create an environ-
ment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to devel-
opment and to the elimination of poverty’. (United Nations, United Nations
Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000, p. 4)
In the same declaration, the heads of state declared the need ‘to halve,
by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less
than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to
reach or to afford safe drinking water’ (ibid, p. 5). Reflecting on the task of
reducing human deprivation in its many dimensions, the Millennium
Declaration also elaborates upon the other major international develop-
ment goals (IDGs) of the past decade, including the need to ensure univer-
sal primary education, to reduce infant and child mortality by two-thirds,
and to reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters (all by 2015) and to
eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education (by 2005).
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Table 7. INEQUALITIES IN EDUCATION, 1990s
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Costa Rica 18 20 34 7
Cote d’Ivoire 13 35 19 14
Indonesia 15 29 22 14
Madagascar 8 41 17 14
South Africa 14 35 19 28
Vietnam 11 36 22 18
Source: UNDP, 2000b.
Poorest 20% Richest 20% Poorest 20% Richest 20%
Percentage of total education
expenditures going to
Percentage of expenditures for
primary education going to
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To meet these ambitious poverty alleviation goals, a combination of
effective domestic and international actions are required. There is, however,
no ‘one size fits all’ blueprint strategy for reaching these targets. In deter-
mining their own urgent priorities based on local realities, developing
countries must change management processes and prepare their own mix
of relevant policies to reduce poverty. The world leaders that convened in
New York for the Millennium Summit recognised that ‘good governance’ is
necessary within each country in order to achieve success in meeting the
objectives outlined above – and this is an area where development agencies
have experience and know-how to offer.  The world leaders also acknowl-
edged that success depends on good governance at the international level
and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems.
From UNDP’s perspective, poverty plans are not simply a set of targeted
interventions completely separated from other economic policies. Since
poverty is a multidimensional problem, it can only be solved through an
integrated, multidimensional programme that includes an estimation of
the extent of domestic poverty and a set of targets.
Until now, most national poverty plans have concentrated on improving
access to basic social services and creating opportunities for income and
employment. Typically, they have not been very successful at setting targets:
of the 140 countries that have implemented anti-poverty plans, only 31%
(43) have set targets for eradicating extreme poverty (UNDP, 2000b). A few,
however, have broadened their goals to include the promotion of commu-
nity participation and an improvement of the environment. Mauritania’s
plan, for example, included strengthening development-oriented NGOs and
in Jamaica the National Poverty Eradication Program pursues community-
based development with a focus on human resources and social develop-
ment (UNDP, 1998).
Poverty plans can also contribute to two additional objectives. First,
they are supposed to encourage active participation of the poor in their for-
mulation and as a result should help to build a stronger civil society.
Second, they are likely to lead to a rise in accountability and transparency,
the two building stones of effective governance.
In the new global economy, however, isolated efforts from individual
countries will not be enough to control the process of globalisation and limit
its negative effects. Profound transformations at the international level are
needed, a new coalition between developing countries has to be built and
nurtured and developing countries must collaborate more closely with each
other. This will require a final and radical solution to the debt burden of
many developing countries, a dramatic increase in development aid, the
elimination of protectionist trading practices in OECD countries and a
much greater concern for global economic equity.
e) Reduce human insecurities
As we have seen, globalisation has increased human insecurity in
several spheres such as the labour market, crime and violence, and finan-
cial instability. In order to reduce human poverty, states need to stop these
negative trends with measures such as:
Constantly improving workers’ skills, establishing a minimum wage,
protecting labour standards and rights, and increasing the productivity of
the informal sector. The reduction of wages or labour rights and the wors-
ening of working conditions do not constitute an effective development
strategy in the long run.
Creating poverty relief programmes in times of financial crisis (includ-
ing expanding social spending) and avoiding solutions based on excessive
fiscal restraint;
Promoting international co-operation against international crime, espe-
cially in law enforcement and surveillance, and strengthening judicial co-
operation. Countries should also develop witness protection programmes
and actively prosecute money laundering.
f) Address the debt crisis and the need for greater equity in the international
system
Human poverty could well increase with the expansion of foreign
investment and trade associated with globalisation, especially if the growth
in these areas continues to be concentrated in the industrial countries. For
one-third of developing countries, the ratio of foreign direct investment to
GDP has actually fallen over the past decade. This has serious implications
for the transfer of technology and know-how, which is heavily biased
towards those countries receiving the most foreign direct investment.
Poor countries must also contend with unfavourable terms of trade and
finance. Particularly in areas of comparative advantage such as textiles and
agriculture, developing countries as a whole must contend with tariffs 10%
higher than the international average – the corresponding figure for least
developed countries is 30%. Further, the opening of financial markets has
constrained the ability of developing country governments to employ
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deficit financing, resulting in significant reductions in spending on health,
education and food subsidies.
These issues pose serious challenges for international, regional and
national governance, in terms of the development of better macro-eco-
nomic policy environments for poverty eradication at all levels, a fairer
institutional environment for global trade, better access to finance for
poor countries, and accelerated debt relief. The heads of state attending
the Millennium Summit committed themselves to ‘an open, equitable,
rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and
financial system’ (Ibid, p. 4), but further steps are still needed to enable
low-income countries to fully participate in the fast globalizing economy.
Some recommended steps to equip developing countries to seize oppor-
tunities in the international system while protecting their people’s inter-
ests are introduced in box 1.2.
Box 1.2
Strengthening the bargaining position of poor countries – 
Four Proposed Actions
Poor countries and poor people have little voice or influence in today’s global pol-
icy-making forums. The most important and influential actor is the G-7, whose
members control the Bretton Woods institutions through voting rights, and the
United Nations Security Council by occupying three of the five permanent seats.
There is no developing country equivalent to the G-7 or OECD – with similar
resources, consultation and policy co-ordination.  But there have been many efforts
to develop collective third world positions through such bodies as the G-15, the G-
24 and the G-77.
UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999 proposed four actions that could be
rapidly set in motion to strengthen the bargaining position of poor countries:
– Provide legal aid. WTO dispute settlement mechanisms can be fair only when all
the parties to a dispute have access to expert services to argue their case. An
independent legal aid centre is needed to assist poor countries. This has now
become a reality, announced at the WTO meeting in Seattle in late 1999.
– Appoint an ombudsman to respond to grievances and investigate injustices.
– Support policy research. OECD countries arrive at multilateral forums with a bat-
tery of policy research to formulate and defend their positions.
– Rely more on regional solidarity and regional institutions. Poor countries can
make their own resources go further by developing common positions in negoti-
ations and developing mutual financial support in crises (UNDP, Human
Development Report 1999, pp. 108-110).
3.2 The role of international development assistance
A growing number of development partners now agree that the ultimate
goal of development is to build human capabilities and enlarge human
choices. Advancing human development, in turn, requires a safe and secure
environment where citizens can live with dignity and equality. In this age of
advanced globalisation, where the forces of change and integration have
markedly intensified, nations require new tools, targeted resources and first-
class policy advice to prevent setbacks in their democratic progress and the
economic and social wellbeing of their people. It is through this set of
issues that international development assistance can have the greatest
impact in overcoming poverty and in strengthening the position of devel-
oping countries vis-à-vis powerful international actors.
a) The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers
In an effort to catalyse more poverty reduction in the developing world,
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund – alongside a range of
development partners in government, the UN system, academia, NGOs and
private sector organisations – have begun spearheading innovative country-
led poverty reduction strategies that are to be summarised in Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This initiative grew out of the 1999
Annual Meetings of the Bank and the Fund, when poverty-reduction con-
cerns were linked to debt-relief issues for highly-indebted poor countries
(HIPC). Finance Ministers participating in the meetings stressed that for
each country under consideration by the HIPC initiative, a ‘poverty reduc-
tion strategy should be in place by the time of the HIPC decision point’ (The
World Bank Group Operations Policy and Strategy, ‘Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers’, Internal Guidance Note, January 21, 2000, p. 1). They con-
cluded that poverty reduction strategies should eventually underpin all
International Development Association (IDA)- and Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF)-supported programs.
Most countries that the World Bank and IMF work with maintain some
type of strategy for poverty reduction. However, the strategies have been
found to vary significantly in scope, depth and participatory thrust.
According to the World Bank, past poverty reduction plans have not always
focused on monitoring results, they often fail to make clear the causal links
between public action and poverty reduction, and they may not reflect a
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participatory approach (ibid., p. 1). A central purpose then of the PRSP pro-
gram is to help countries fill these gaps and to improve the design and
implementation of their poverty reduction strategies.
Poor performance in reducing poverty has multiple causes, and conse-
quently, most development analysts and practitioners believe that action is
needed on both the domestic policy and external assistance fronts. This, in
turn, raises two sets of issues:
How to identify effective strategies to reduce poverty; and
How to modify external partnerships and assistance to reduce poverty
more effectively.
National poverty reduction strategies are then seen as helping to
improve the poverty impact of expenditures financed by external partners
and the effectiveness of technical advice by increasing country ownership
and shifting policy to a more results-oriented approach (World Bank,
Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, [Washington, DC: World Bank,
2000], p. 1).
Recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers presented to the Executive
Boards of the World Bank and IMF proposed an enhanced framework for
poverty reduction in low-income countries. The Interim and Development
Committees of these international financial institutions have strongly
endorsed this approach, which encourages low-income countries to fight
poverty by focusing on a renewed growth-oriented strategy. Another outcome
of the PRSP process has been to enhance Bank/Fund collaboration, so as to
better assist low-income countries in attacking poverty. The more immediate
objective of this close collaboration is to ‘help the country authorities to pro-
duce a poverty reduction strategy that appropriately balances financial/macro-
economic and structural/social considerations’ (The World Bank Group
Operations Policy and Strategy, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers”, p. 3).
b) The experience of the UNDP
Until recently, the critical links between governance and human devel-
opment were not sufficiently understood. It is now a widely shared belief
that the main reasons for continued human deprivation are not just eco-
nomic. These problems go hand in hand with political and social factors
rooted in poor governance. In recognition of the close relationship between
the quality of a nation’s governance and whether it succeeds or fails to
reduce poverty, governance for human development – or humane gover-
nance – is a chief priority for the UN Development Programme.
The UNDP’s approach to governance is unequivocal about placing individ-
uals and their choices at the centre of the development process and embraces
the principles of empowerment, participation, equity and sustainability.
Governance must be rooted in these principles to move a society toward
greater human development, including poverty eradication, environmental
protection and regeneration, gender equality and sustainable livelihoods.
Governance was explicitly confirmed as a programming objective within
the UNDP with the publication in January 1997 of the UNDP’s Governance
Policy, though the UNDP had previously supported governance programmes at
various levels. When the UNDP was first established in 1965, its mandate gave
it the status of a fund management agency, not a development organisation.
Technical assistance for development financed by the UNDP was contracted
from the UN Specialised Agencies who assisted governments in managing spe-
cific state functions. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, UNDP introduced
participatory approaches to development, expanded its work with NGOs, and
incorporated private-sector approaches to public-sector management.
By the late 1980s, structural adjustment policies placed the perform-
ance of the public sector high on the political agenda, and the role of the
state, its size, cost and productivity came into question. Pressures to reform
the public administration to address these new relationships and to encom-
pass an increased role for local authorities and the private sector encour-
aged the UNDP to set up in 1988 one of its most successful global pro-
grammes, the Management Development Programme (MDP). The primary
objective of the programme was to help countries undertake system-wide
changes in response to transitions to a new economy, institutional reforms,
and administrative improvement.
By 1993, the MDP’s considerable range of experience led to the conclu-
sion that for governments to be effective and responsive in the pursuit of
national development, the state could not be the sole responsible actor.
‘Government’ did not equate with the evolving concept of ‘governance’, and
the UNDP’s mandate suddenly broadened beyond its formerly exclusive
work with government itself. Between 1992 and 1998, 50% (or $5 billion) of
all the UNDP’s resources was allocated to programmes promoting political,
economic and social governance. Of this, 53% went to six areas of humane
governance: strengthening governing institutions (legislative, judicial, elec-
toral and human rights); supporting decentralisation and local governance;
promoting public sector reform; assisting governance in crisis and post-con-
flict situations; and enhancing democratisation and political empowerment
of the poor through strengthening civil society organisations.
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Today, while UNDP assistance for public sector management pro-
grammes still features prominently in the UNDP country and regional pro-
grammes in the area of governance, the following is projected:
activities focusing on the private sector feature in around 55% of future
programming;
activities supporting civil society organisations are incorporated in 65%
of future programmes; and,
62% of the expected programmes will direct assistance to governing
institutions.
This represents a significant shift from a traditional UNDP focus on
public sector management and financial and economic management.
The UNDP works with its partners in the South to help them respond to
a world of limited public flows. As detailed earlier, since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, private as well as public flows have been attracted to those countries
with good policy and institutional frameworks – and not because of mere
political alliances. The UNDP helps prepare its clients for a world where tech-
nology and information are powerful agents of change compared to the old-
fashioned hardware of economics. For instance, it was allegedly two UNDP
consultants who, many years ago, persuaded the authorities of Singapore
that there was a gap between when the London stock markets opened and
the Japanese markets were up and running. Out of their simple study of the
clock emerged one of Singapore’s future competitive advantages.
Whether the entry point for the UNDP is electoral assistance, such as the
$80 million in donor funds it co-ordinated for Indonesia’s national elections
in 1999, or an anti-corruption programme such as that recently established
in Nigeria, the future will involve comprehensive governance programme
where the UNDP works out with governments and civil society how a coun-
try is going to take advantage of globalisation’s opportunities. The future of
the UNDP, therefore, rests in its ability to deliver the right kind of strategic
advice at the right time, and through its vast network of 135 country offices,
on the ground in the right place.
In an essay addressing how global forces can exacerbate or help reduce
poverty, it is crucial to also recognise the contributions that institutions of
regional and global governance can make in improving a developing coun-
try’s ability to progress. At the regional level, for example, the UNDP’s
Environmental Programme for the Danube River Basin helps integrate sev-
eral regional players in a combined attack on the region’s environmental
challenges. The programme, recently extended to incorporate environmen-
tal issues related to the Black Sea Basin has been highly successful in
improving international co-operation for the sustainable management of
the Danube River and the Black Sea Basins.
Concerned with the local, national and international dimensions of cor-
ruption, mismanagement, sustainability, violence, human rights, and the
marginalisation of the poor, the UNDP seeks to assist governing structures
in their efforts to deliver what people want and need. For democracies to
flourish in an era of heightened, global interdependence, citizens must be
afforded economic and social betterment and the means to exercise one’s
freedom to choose. This is possible only when the ‘humane governance’
priorities of meaningful participation, accountability, transparency, and the
rule of law deliver human development. Without humane governance prac-
tices, public and donor resources are often inefficiently wasted, siphoned-
off for personal gain, and fail to reach the intended beneficiary.
The UNDP’s Comparative Advantages: To assist states with the tasks of
achieving humane governance and accessing new opportunities through
the key determinants of globalisation, the UNDP has many institutional
strengths that, together, set it apart from other external partners concerned
with governance issues:
Impartiality – the UNDP works as an agent for change with all actors;
Customer orientation – UNDP pursues its mandate within national pri-
orities;
Long time frame – the UNDP views development from a long-term per-
spective and seeks to maintain a presence in programme countries;
Experience – the UNDP has 50 years of experience in capacity development;
Trust – the UNDP long ago won the trust of governments and other part-
ners in programme countries; and
Universality – the UNDP’s field presence in 137 countries ensures ongo-
ing dialogue, learning and co-operation.
The UNDP’s particular competitive edge in the fight against poverty is
its governance advisory role rooted in rigorous analysis and five decades of
on-the-ground experience. The UNDP is being asked by many governments
to help them in difficult and sensitive areas such as judicial and civil serv-
ice reform, the functioning of parliaments, and institution-building for
human rights protection and women’s rights. Further, the UNDP works to
increase participation and strengthen civil society, a role in which the
UNDP in many cases is afforded a much wider license by programme coun-
tries than an international NGO or a bilateral donor.
As examined earlier, action solely at global and regional levels will be
insufficient in helping developing countries to reduce the negative effects of
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globalisation, including the exacerbation of poverty levels. The front lines
will always be at the national and local community levels, and the best
approach to preparing a country and its people is to establish strong insti-
tutions (both state, civil society and private sector) that are participatory,
accountable and help promote the rule of law. Many development organi-
sations from diverse backgrounds are now engaged in specific activities to
improve decision-making and implementation structures and processes.
The following are the UNDP’s key areas of intervention:
c) The UNDP’s entry points for poverty alleviation through better national
and local governance
To achieve its mandate of developing national capacities for humane
governance so that countries can better cope with the exigencies of global-
isation, the UNDP targets its assistance and builds core competencies in the
following areas:
Strengthening governing institutions – legislatures (national and provin-
cial), judiciaries and electoral bodies.
Updating public and private sector management practices – including
leadership and management of changes, civil service reform, economic and
financial management and urban management.
Supporting decentralisation and local governance – Decentralising gov-
ernment enables people to participate more directly in governance process-
es and can help empower people previously excluded from decision-making.
Empowering civil society organisations – CSOs are the wellspring of
social capital – people working together for a common purpose – that is
essential for humane governance. CSOs can advocate and monitor reform
that fosters sustainable human development.
Countries in special circumstances – While humane governance pro-
grammes can reduce the risk of crisis generally, the UNDP can support spe-
cific efforts before, during and after crises.
In the design and implementation of governance programmes and proj-
ects, UNDP emphasises participation, consensus building, flexibility and a
long-term view of development (see box 1.3). When building strategic,
national capacities, the UNDP focuses on programmes that are sustainable
and centred on people, particularly those discriminated against and the
poor. Given the UNDP’s proven expertise in these areas, the organisation
has taken the lead on governance issues for the United Nations System-
wide Special Initiative on Africa (box 1.4).
d) The importance of partnerships
It is fitting to conclude an essay dealing with strategies for alleviating
global poverty by underscoring the significance of partnerships – howev-
er varied and asymmetrical – in achieving progress toward human devel-
opment.
Civil society organisations, business groups, the media, trade unions,
religious institutions, think tanks, academia, governments and interna-
tional agencies (both bi- and multi-lateral in nature) all have something
to contribute to the struggle for greater justice, as well as social and eco-
nomic improvement (see box 1.5). Working alone in isolation of one
another, each of these actors would have a limited and short-lived impact
in improving the quality of life in a community. On the other hand,
through a complex web of partnerships based on the principles of respect
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Box 1.3
Reforming governance to reduce poverty in Kenya
Launched in March 1999 with support from UNDP, Kenya’s new National
Poverty Eradication Plan is a 15-year programme modelled on the commitments of
the World Summit for Social Development. It recognises that previous poverty
reduction efforts have failed to reach the poor largely because of implementation
problems and weak governance structures. The government has established the
Poverty Eradication Commission, comprising a cross-section of interest groups, as
an independent body to monitor implementation of the poverty plan.
A notable aspect of the plan is its Charter for Social Integration, which states that
citizens have the right to make decisions about matters that vitally affect their mate-
rial and social well being. It also identifies basic needs with individual rights. Health,
literacy, food security, clean water and freedom from injustice and physical harm are
among the rights it underscores. Communities, the charter states, also have rights:
they should be able to organise for their development, and minority communities in
particular should have the right to maintain their cultural identities.
Although the plan emphasises inclusive and participatory development, practices
at the district might fall short of objectives. District staff will have to be trained in
new ways of designing and implementing projects so that beneficiaries are involved
every step of the way. Previous projects, such as those carried out by the District
Focus for Rural Development, stressed the importance of participation but were
implemented as government-engineered activities. The challenge is to find appro-
priate governance structures to implement the participatory principles of the pover-
ty plan. Considerable resources and broad democratic decision-making will be need-
ed to involve the poor in advancing their own development (UNDP, Overcoming
Poverty: Poverty Report 2000, [New York: UNDP, 2000], p.59).
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Box 1.4
Combating poverty at its roots:
The UN System’s Special Initiative on Africa
Fifty-four percent of Africa’s people live in absolute poverty, and Africa is the only
region in the world where poverty is projected to increase over the next decade. The
annual rate of population growth for the continent is the highest in the world, and
twenty-two out of twenty-five African countries appear in the UNDP Human
Development Index’s category of ‘low human development’ (with African countries
also comprising thirty-three out of the forty-seven labelled as ‘least developed coun-
tries’). Further, the proliferation of armed conflicts – and the accompanying massive
loss of human lives, refugees and internally displaced persons – strengthens the per-
ception of Africa as a continent in turmoil severely lacking in political stability.
Against this backdrop and recognising that Africa represents the ‘foremost chal-
lenge of global development’, the United Nations System-wide Special Initiative on
Africa was launched on 15 March 1996, with the participation of the Presidents of
Ghana and Senegal, the Vice President of Kenya and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN
Secretary-General, the President of the World Bank, and the Heads of several UN
organisations. This integrated, multi-year programme has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
develop further practical initiatives to maximise the support provided by UN system
to African development; and (2) to raise the priority given to Africa in the interna-
tional agenda. Regarding the second point in particular, the Special Initiative seeks
to mobilise the political support needed to ensure that timely action is taken to
remove the many obstacles to African development. Over the past several years, the
programme helped to establish a supportive role for donors in Africa by reinforcing
that Africans, both women and men, must be at the centre of their own development.
In this spirit, most of the resources of the Special Initiative have been firmly rooted
in national programmes of action that were locally defined and managed.
For managing the programme, a Steering Committee was established, co-chaired
by the Administrator of UNDP and the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic
Commission for Africa, and the following five working groups were set-up:
– Water (under the chairmanship of UNEP);
– Food Security (under the chairmanship of FAO);
– Governance (under the chairmanship of UNDP);
– Social and Human Development (under the chairmanship of UNESCO);
– Resource Mobilisation (under the chairmanship of the World Bank).
While Africa continues to exist on the edge of survival with, by many accounts,
discouraging prospects, efforts such as the Special Initiative on Africa have helped the
international community to focus seriously on a few issues of high priority and to
effectively mobilise and co-ordinate the efforts of African governments and Africa’s
development partners toward achieving their stated goals (United Nations System-
wide Special Initiative on Africa: http://www.undp.org/rba/special/siamain.htm)
and shared responsibility, the actions and influence of individual develop-
ment actors can be scaled-up, creating new opportunities for hope and
change among the beneficiary groups.
The conventional model of a technocratic government supported by donors
was always incomplete. More than ever, policy and aid effectiveness depend on
inputs from a wide range of agents and their institutional frameworks. Further,
given that several of the development actors who hold promise for doing good
are also the same organisations that can hinder progress, partnerships can
serve another useful purpose: to create greater transparency in society and to
shame organisations that harm others and the ecosystem into changing their
behaviour. This has been one of the objectives of the UN Secretary-General’s
Global Compact Initiative with the international business community. When the
bonds of respect and shared responsibility are established, people listen to one
another, even if the advice is at times critical and seemingly against the short-
term interests of the accused organisation or individual.
In the crusade against human poverty – in all its dimensions – the
broader international development community must encourage a range of
ZÉPHIRIN DIABRÉ184
Box 1.5
Promoting public-private partnerships in Trinidad and Tobago
To advance poverty reduction efforts in Trinidad and Tobago, UNDP has worked
closely with the government’s Change Management Unit for Poverty Eradication and
Equity Building, part of the Ministry of Social and Community Development. The
unit includes the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council on Social Development, with
representatives from 14 government-ministries and from the Tobago House of
Assembly, which spearheads the implementation of the government’s commitments
at the United Nations-sponsored world summits. It also has a Civic Council on Social
Equity, an umbrella group of 19 civic organisations to involve representatives of poor
communities in a national policy dialogue.
One of the unit’s more promising initiatives is the Adopt a Community pro-
gramme, which fosters collaboration between the private sector and local commu-
nities. In 20 communities, selected through a 1996 survey on the determinants of liv-
ing conditions, corporations assist the local government for 30 months with projects
in education, training, infrastructure, sports and culture.  Several companies, includ-
ing local banks and multinational enterprises, have volunteered to participate in the
programme. UNDP has been providing technical assistance to enable the unit to
monitor the projects (UNDP, Overcoming Human Poverty, p. 79).
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partnerships to innovate good policies and to help build first-rate institu-
tions, from the global level through the regional and national to the local
levels. Partnerships must be at the heart of all future negotiations and
implementation programmes, including for the upcoming Third United
Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in May and next
year’s UN Conference on Financing for Development. The exchange of fresh
thinking that will ensue from these experiences will facilitate the search for
new ways to manage globalisation and to make markets work for all peo-
ple, especially children, women and the poor.
4. CONCLUSION
Globalisation has dramatically altered the way the world is organised.
It has brought people closer, increased wealth tremendously, democratised
the access to information and raised new hopes for the future.
Many of these hopes, however, have not yet materialised for a majority
of the world’s people. The world is still very unequal and a majority of its
occupants suffer from either poverty or increasing human insecurity. The
challenge for the new century is, therefore, immense. As the 1999 Human
Development Report clearly recognises, we need to ‘find the rules and insti-
tutions for stronger governance – local, national, regional and global – to
preserve the advantages of global markets and competition, but also to pro-
vide enough space for human, community and environmental resources to
ensure that globalisation works for people – not just for profits’ (UNDP,
1999, p. 2). In our ability to succeed, rest the chances of constructing a
world in which human poverty and inequality are no longer a problem.
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